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THE SUPREME COURT AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
JOSEPH D. KEARNEY*
This is a great privilege. I never would have expected to be on this
side of the podium for the Pallium Lecture.
Tonight’s topic is the Supreme Court and religious liberty. It is along
the lines of what Archbishop Jerome Listecki suggested (and we Chicago
White Sox fans have to support one another). So let’s get right into it.
After all, we have only a little more than an hour together—or fifty
minutes or so on my account, and as much time thereafter as the good
judgment of the moderator, John Rothstein, supports.
We must start with the fact that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides for religious liberty. It is not the only
guarantee of religious liberty, and the Supreme Court of the United
States is not the only entity with authority on some questions of religious
liberty. Those are related points. On the first point, almost every state
has, in its own constitution, an analogue to the First Amendment, though
sometimes speaking in notably different terms. For example, just to give
you a local flavor, Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution
begins as follows: “The right of every person to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall
any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship,
or to maintain any ministry, without consent . . . .” And it goes on from
there. Thus, on my second point of a moment ago, state supreme courts
have authority to protect against interferences with religious liberty by
state and local governments. Additional complications arise because
legislative bodies are capable of granting rights as well as interfering with
rights. This is a point to which we shall have to return before we are
finished.
Yet I think it quite justifiable to focus the bulk of our attention on the
Supreme Court and the First Amendment. First, the Court has the final
authority to interpret, where a case presents the question, the First
* Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University. This is a lightly edited version of the
Archdiocese of Milwaukee’s Pallium Lecture delivered October 21, 2015. The author wishes
to thank Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., and Scott C. Idleman for their indispensable counsel
concerning this lecture.
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Amendment. It has that authority because it announced as much in 1803
in Marbury v. Madison1—surely the most important case that the Court
ever decided. This was not, of course, a case involving religious liberty
(Mr. Marbury had no claim of religious entitlement to receive the
commission as justice of the peace that President Adams had signed at
figuratively midnight before his departure from office). But the reference
to Marbury is worthwhile not simply because, as Tom Shriner and I
emphasize in our Federal Courts class, one referring to Marbury v.
Madison feels important (as should one hearing the reference, by the
way). It’s worthwhile because, given Marbury and its use over the years,
the Supreme Court’s supremacy in constitutional pronouncements now is
an established fact or convention. So while a state or Congress may
provide additional liberty, the First Amendment as interpreted by the
Court provides a baseline—a floor—below which no government entity
may go. Second, in terms of justifying our focus, let us not forget that our
primary identification as citizens is overwhelmingly with the national
government, not the state. We are Americans. This was not always so,
of course—consider our pre-Civil War forebears—but there is no doubt
about it now. In short, when we think of religious liberty and legal rights,
as with so many other things, we think especially of federal protections—
which means that we think especially of the First Amendment and of the
Supreme Court.
So on to the First Amendment, which says: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .” What has the Supreme Court done with this? The
Court and the Amendment have been with us for a while—225 years, give
or take a year in the different instances—and it is useful to divide the
Court’s work into three eras. These are not of equal length (the first era
would last into the 1960s) and are not watertight compartments. But it is
a useful framing device (he says hopefully).
To begin, for a long time—almost a century—the Court did very little
with the First Amendment. How could that be? Well, recall that it speaks
in terms of federal power—Congress shall make no law. That limited
reach meant that there was little for the United States Supreme Court to
do. Yet there was one nineteenth-century case of note: Reynolds v.
United States,2 decided in 1879. Reynolds had been convicted in a federal
court of bigamy, which federal law proscribed in the Utah territory (Utah
was not yet a state, hence the applicability of federal law). He contended
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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that this violated his First Amendment rights. The contention did not get
him far. The Court unanimously held that Reynolds had been subject to
legal sanction not for his religious belief but for criminal activity; the First
Amendment protected the former but not the latter. The Court said that
“those who make polygamy a part of their religion” cannot be “excepted
from the operation of the statute.”3 Laws “cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, [but] they may with practices,” the Court
went on, whether bigamy, human sacrifice, or suicide.4 The Reynolds case
reflects the first era’s reigning principle: specifically, that the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause provides no exemption from laws of
general applicability. The case is a touchstone to which we will return.
What happened to end this first era? Well, an awful lot had to occur,
as the era did not end for more than another 80 years. So there is a lot
for us to unpack in the era itself. For a most important, threshold matter,
the Civil War happened. Or, more precisely, after the war, in 1868, the
people of the United States adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Or, more precisely yet, that amendment eventually was
held to apply, against the states, most of the same restrictions applied
under the Bill of Rights to the federal government. This is the so-called
incorporation doctrine, well known to any lawyers and a number of others
here, I am sure. The Fourteenth Amendment’s protections were held to
include the First Amendment’s guarantees, and it therefore no longer
mattered that the earlier amendment spoke in terms of things that
Congress might not do. The First Amendment’s prohibitions now applied
to the states as well.
Before we discuss some of the cases in and around the time of
incorporation, let’s be clear that we understand the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. I make no suggestion that nothing happened
during this time affecting religious liberty. Indeed, it was a rich era. If
you stretch its time boundaries a little bit, it included Virginia’s Statute
for Religious Freedom (written by Thomas Jefferson) and James
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments—in fact, these 1770s and 1780s matters preceded the First
Amendment by a few years.
The time period also saw the
disestablishment of various Protestant churches—that is, their separation
from the state governments that had supported them—with the last of
these occurring in Massachusetts in 1833. And, much later (in the 1870s),

3. Id. at 166.
4. Id.
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it saw the so-called Blaine Amendments, which changed various state
constitutions to ban government support of seminaries or church schools.
But the salient point for us is that the Supreme Court had little to do
with developments around religious freedom. This may seem a long time
ago, and in many respects it was, but it is striking to note that, for more
than half our history, religious liberty was a matter that simply was not a
notable portion of the Supreme Court’s work.
Nor did even incorporation end the first era—or at least not right
away. Yet in the same general timeframe as incorporation—let us call it
1925 to 1950—there were hints, however incomplete, of things to come.
In this regard, we must discuss Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 an important
case. Pierce was a 1925 case involving a challenge to an Oregon law
requiring children between eight and sixteen years old to attend school—
public school. As a treatise coauthored by one of my colleagues,
Professor Scott Idleman, has described it, “[t]his public school monopoly
law was narrowly enacted by an electoral initiative led by an ignoble crew
of nativists, Ku Klux Klanners, Scottish Rite Masons, and antiCatholics . . . .”6 But this crew proved no match for the sisters—the
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, to be precise.
The Supreme Court struck down Oregon’s law. It did not invoke the
First Amendment. It relied on something rather more vague: the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—which prohibits states
from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The Court indicated that there was a liberty interest in a parent’s or
guardian’s right to decide how his or her children were to be educated.
Let’s listen to its words:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think
it entirely plain that the Act . . . unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. As often heretofore
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State.7
The Court went on to say that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,

5. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
6. BORIS I. BITTKER, SCOTT C. IDLEMAN & FRANK S. RAVITCH, RELIGION AND THE
STATE IN AMERICAN LAW 751 (2015).
7. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
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coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”8
So it was liberty that formed the basis for the Court’s ruling in Pierce,
but not specifically religious liberty; indeed, the key precedent had
nothing to do with religious liberty. In Meyer v. Nebraska,9 a couple of
years before Pierce, the Court had struck down a 1919 state law requiring
all grade-school education—public or private, including parochial—to be
in the English language. It was not enough to have won World War I,
apparently; even afterwards, Nebraska’s statute, like laws elsewhere at
the time, targeted German-language instruction. In the brief opinion
striking down that statute as unconstitutional, the Court invoked
“liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment.10
So these were Fourteenth Amendment concepts, but application of
the First Amendment—that is, incorporation—was near at hand. This
was part of a gradual process, with different parts of the Bill of Rights
being held to be incorporated in a series of cases over the years. But
within about two decades of Pierce—that is, by the time of Everson v.
Board of Education,11 in 1947—the Court would say that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment apply to the states.
The cases in between are interesting and deserve discussion. They
include Cantwell v. Connecticut,12 a 1940 decision invalidating the
conviction of three Jehovah’s Witnesses for distributing religious
literature on the streets of New Haven (aggravating the Catholics in the
neighborhood, by the way) and, in the process, soliciting contributions.
This violated a law requiring solicitors of such funds to obtain a certificate
of “approv[al]” from a state official.13 Murdock v. Pennsylvania14 in 1943
struck down an ordinance that required solicitors to purchase a license
from the local borough—at least striking it down as applied to one asking
for contributions in exchange for religious books and pamphlets. And
that same year, the famous case of West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette15 held that children in a public school could not be required to
salute the flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 535.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399, 400.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 302.
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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These cases all share an important characteristic. It is not that they
all involved Jehovah’s Witnesses, although that is true and even
interesting. The important point is that these were at least as much—
indeed, they seem to have been more—free-speech cases as (or than)
free-exercise-of-religion cases. This need not have been the case. That
is, under some conceptions, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
could have provided a sufficient basis for striking down laws whose effect
was to prohibit distribution of religious literature or to require one to
proceed against the dictates of one’s conscience by (for example) saluting
the flag. But the Court did not go that route.
I have focused on free exercise cases because they go plainly to
religious liberty. That is, they typically involve some citizen’s defending
himself against state action by claiming a First Amendment right. Yet I
should note that there were some important Establishment Clause cases
along the way. For example, in Everson, our 1947 case, the Court rejected
a challenge to a New Jersey law whose effect was to reimburse parents
variously providing public-bus transportation of their children to both
public and private schools, including religious ones. The case may have
seemed a victory for Catholics, but it came at a cost. The entire Court—
even those justices in the majority, which rejected the Establishment
Clause challenge—thought especially significant in interpreting the First
Amendment the controversies in 1770s and 1780s Virginia that had
prompted Jefferson to draft Virginia’s statute for religious freedom and
Madison to write his remonstrance against religious assessments.16 This
has seemed unfortunate to many, not least because it enabled the Court
to observe in the process that “the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and
State.’”17 Indeed, it described that wall as “high and impregnable.”18
Much criticism has been directed at this reasoning, especially as it has
subsequently been used to sustain various Establishment Clause
challenges—e.g., to the government display of various crèches or
menorahs or the Ten Commandments (even as the Court has rejected
some such challenges and thus upheld certain other displays). Yet I am
not spending much time on Establishment Clause cases because they
generally involve the citizen’s complaining not about the government’s
direct interference with his religious liberty but rather about its lack of

16. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11–13; id. at 28–29, 31, 33–41, 63–72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
18. Id. at 18.
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neutrality or its support of religion. Those can be important complaints,
but they are outside my focus here.
So let us return to the Free Exercise Clause—secure in the knowledge
from Everson that the religion clauses were incorporated and not even
concerned that, despite the press of time this evening, we are still in the
first era. In these mid-twentieth-century circumstances, although we
were living fully in an era of incorporation of the First Amendment, there
was little basis for thinking that anything substantively had changed
otherwise from the Reynolds era. Indeed, as late as 1961, in Braunfeld v.
Brown,19 the Court held that a Sunday-closing law did not violate the
rights of Orthodox Jewish merchants who wanted to be closed on
Saturday but open on Sunday. It said that the law imposed only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion—that is, it did not make
unlawful any religious practice itself. Essentially, the approach of
Reynolds (which the Court cited) prevailed in Braunfeld, and there was
no meaningful scrutiny of this generally applicable law.
One of the dissenters in Braunfeld was Justice William Brennan. And
only two years later Justice Brennan would command a majority of the
Court for his views. The case was Sherbert v. Verner,20 and it brings us—
at last—to the second era of the Supreme Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence. The underlying circumstances were hard to distinguish
from Braunfeld. Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired from her
job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day in her
religion. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied
her benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing
Saturday work. In finding a violation of Sherbert’s First Amendment
rights, the Court engaged in a balancing of interests: It held that the state’s
eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a
significant burden on Sherbert’s ability to freely exercise her faith and
that there was no compelling state interest that justified this.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented in Sherbert. He noted that
the state law was one that the state supreme court had “uniformly
applied.”21 He even was concerned that allowing an exception for
Sherbert based on her religion amounted to a violation of the
Establishment Clause. And he noted the incompatibility of the decision
with Braunfeld, which only two years earlier had upheld the right of a
state to prohibit businesses from being open and to provide for a day of
19. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rest on Sunday—without any balancing of the costs imposed on an
individual citizen. Justice Harlan was joined in dissent by Justice Byron
White. It might be interesting to note that the former would be gone a
decade later when the Court decided Roe v. Wade,22 but the latter would
find himself in dissent there as well.
Let us leave aside any path from the restrictions on the government
in Sherbert to such restrictions in Roe (it is an understatement that the
cases are distinguishable, but I am right to be provocative here). The
important point emerging from Sherbert is that the Court might require
an exception based on religion to a law or government rule, even where
that law or rule was neutral and of general application. That the First
Amendment could require such an exception would become the hallmark
of the Court’s second era of free exercise jurisprudence.
And while it did not last nearly as long as the first, it was,
unquestionably, an era. Sherbert led to such decisions as Wisconsin v.
Yoder.23 In defending against a criminal action, Amish parents
challenged the Wisconsin compulsory-education law. In 1972, the Court
held that the First Amendment, as incorporated, prevented the state from
requiring that Amish children remain in school past the eighth grade,
until age sixteen. The Court was most sympathetic, ruling that
Wisconsin’s law violated the Amish parents’ free exercise rights.
Let me return to being provocative. It should not go unremarked that
the timeframe that we have thus far discussed in this second era—the
1960s and early 1970s—was one in which the Court was rather willing to
recognize rights well beyond free exercise of religion. Some of this
involved other First Amendment rights—such as Cohen v. California,24 a
1971 decision involving the defendant’s wearing a shirt with an obscenity
concerning the Vietnam War draft. But some of it also was less tied to
the text of the Constitution, including such famous (and to some
infamous) cases as Griswold v. Connecticut,25 which in 1965 found a
constitutional right on the part of married couples to use birth control
products, and Roe v. Wade, recognizing a constitutional right to abortion
in 1973. These rights were found not so much in the specific text of the
Constitution as in a right of privacy emerging from the Constitution’s
“emanations” and “penumbras” (to use words from Griswold).26 The key

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
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precedents in these decisions? Well, it would be far afield to dig deeply
into them, but it may be noted that in Griswold the Court could say,
“[W]e reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.”27 You
will recall those as our 1920s cases invalidating a state ban on Germanlanguage instruction (Meyer) and a state requirement of public as
opposed to religious education (Pierce). It is a jurisprudential challenge
to applaud the one set of cases while booing the other—not an impossible
one, no doubt, but a challenge.
In all events, given this, it should not come as a large surprise that the
emergence of a different Supreme Court in the 1980s and beyond, with
some (though never yet most) of its members intent on undoing Roe v.
Wade, also brought with it less interest in maintaining the approach of
Sherbert and Yoder. This is not to suggest that Sherbert and Yoder were
the entirety of the second era. For example, in Thomas v. Review Board,28
the Court in 1981 validated the free exercise rights of a Jehovah’s Witness
who had quit his job after a transfer to a position that required that he
build military equipment in violation of his religious tenets. In
overturning Indiana’s refusal to accord unemployment benefits, the
Court said that “a person may not be compelled to choose between the
exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise
available public program.”29 Once again, the Court employed a balancing
test that permitted exceptions to laws of general applicability for the
individual religious needs of citizens. It would still be doing so as late as
1989—in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,30 a
unanimous unemployment benefits case and a generation after Sherbert
by conventional measures (although Justice Brennan was still on the
Court).
The era would soon end. A year later, we entered into what can
reasonably be termed a third era, although some would characterize it as
a return to the first.
The key decision is Employment Division v. Smith,31 from 1990. It
involved two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private
drug rehabilitation organization. They ingested peyote—a drug that was
hallucinogenic—as part of their religious ceremonies and were
consequently fired. The state denied their claim for unemployment

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 483.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Id. at 716.
489 U.S. 829 (1989).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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compensation because the reason for their dismissal was considered
work-related “misconduct.”32 The state supreme court concluded that
this denial of benefits violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. The United States Supreme Court reversed: Justice Antonin
Scalia spoke for the Court in ruling against the free exercise claim. “We
have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of
our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”33 Scalia
invoked Reynolds v. United States—you will recall that 1879 case
upholding the conviction of a Mormon for bigamy.
And he noted that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held that
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press . . . .”34 Hybrid situations, as Justice Scalia would term them—and
let us pause for a moment to note that, on this front, he cited Cantwell
and Murdock, some of our Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. “[O]r,” the Court
continued, cases that involved “the right of parents, acknowledged in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the education of their children,”35 and
for this it invoked Yoder.
Let us leave aside the other cases that Justice Scalia cited (for he
certainly had to engage with Sherbert) and return to his language—the
Court’s language:
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from
governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to
do so now. There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children
in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since
Reynolds plainly controls. “Our cases do not at their farthest
reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 874.
Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 881.
Id. (citation omitted).
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opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a
democratic government.”36
Smith was decided in Justice Brennan’s final months on the Court,
concluding some 34 years of service, and it would find him in dissent,
together with Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun.
We continue to be in this third era of constitutional law that Smith
ushered in. The constitutional decisions that follow Smith, even where
they have ruled for the citizen’s free exercise rights, have not involved
some balancing test. For example, in 1993, in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,37 the Court ruled for the Santerian
religious claimant, but that was a case of pretty well overt discrimination.
Local ordinances aimed at the church’s practice of ritual animal sacrifice.
The problem was that the ordinances contained so many exemptions for
all sorts of animal killings that the only conduct to come within the scope
of the law was this church’s ritual sacrifice. Here we had a law that was
neither neutral nor generally applicable, so Smith did not apply, and the
city could not meet the compelling state interest requirement.
There is little else by way of constitutional law in this third era. How
can this be? And should I therefore declare my remarks concluded with
respect to my topic and open it up to questions—or, better yet, simply sit
down? Well, it is not yet time to yield the floor. For we have finished the
story of the Supreme Court’s engagement with the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause but not that of its grappling with religious freedom.
The reason is that, shortly after Smith, the United States Congress got
into the act and gave to citizens broader free exercise rights and to the
courts the responsibility of protecting them. Specifically, in 1993,
Congress, with the concurrence of President Clinton, enacted RFRA: the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.38 There is no doubt as to its purpose:
It was to vindicate Justice Brennan over Justice Scalia. Well, that is to
personalize it a little too much, I admit, but it was to reject Smith (Scalia’s
opinion) and to enshrine Sherbert (Brennan’s). That is what the
Restoration portion of the Act’s title meant. To put it in doctrinal terms
(legal doctrine, not church doctrine), RFRA reinstated the strict scrutiny
standard even for neutral and generally applicable laws.
Let’s discuss that a bit. RFRA lays down a general rule that
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
36. Id. at 882 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)).
37. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)).
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religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability . . . .”39 Then it provides for the possibility of exceptions—
that is, circumstances in which the government can impose a substantial
burden. An exception will apply if the burden—the government
obligation or regulation, say—“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”40 That’s quite the different
standard from Smith; in fact, it’s Sherbert. It’s also unconstitutional, the
Court said in 1997, insofar as its scope included (as Congress intended)
actions of state and local governments within this standard.41 But let us
not get lost in that 1997 decision, interesting as it was for other
constitutional reasons (involving Congress’s ability, or inability, to go
beyond the Supreme Court’s recognition of rights in enforcing the
Constitution).
I say that for two reasons: One is that RFRA itself continues to restrict
or control the actions of the federal government. That portion was not
struck down in 1997, and its continued viability has subsequently been
made clear by the Court. This is a big deal because the federal
government is a big deal: The federal government of today has become
rather more a government of general jurisdiction than ever previously. It
is involved in protecting lands, issuing mandates about water and air,
governing housing, and regulating employment, just to scratch the
surface. So there is a lot of federal government action for which federal
law now requires accommodations based on religious liberty. The other
reason not to get lost in the 1997 decision striking down RFRA with
respect to the states is that in 2000 Congress passed the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (or RLUIPA),42 which contains the
same substantive standard for religious liberty as RFRA and applies to
state and local governments but avoids the constitutional problem
(largely by tying Congress’s restriction of state and local governments to
those governments’ acceptance of federal funds). And the result of this—
i.e., the combination of RFRA and RLUIPA—is that in the lower courts
there has been a veritable explosion of successful religious liberty claims
in the past decade and a half, well beyond (in my estimation) anything

39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
40. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
41. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2012)).
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that we saw in the second era of First Amendment free exercise law,
which Sherbert ushered in and Smith then sent packing.
Something else has been at work also—a point that I have thus far
avoided but that bears comment, even emphasis: One aspect of the Free
Exercise Clause that the Court has expanded and maintained in its
expanded version, and that seems to have made its way into the new
statutes, is the meaning of the term “religion.” Over the past 140 or so
years (so roughly Reynolds forward), the Court has moved from a largely
monotheistic view to a more broadly theistic view to an essentially
spiritual, non-theistic (though not necessarily atheistic) approach to
religion. In 1981 (in Thomas), for example, the Court had the following
to say:
The determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice is
more often than not a difficult and delicate task . . . . However,
the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial
perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.43
The matter is complex, and I wish to bottom-line it: Even today, the reach
of the Free Exercise Clause is broad, in terms of the range of beliefs
covered under the rubric “religion,” even if post-Smith the punch that the
clause packs typically is ineffectual, in the sense that it is much harder to
use the clause to obtain heightened scrutiny than it was during the second
era. It is possible that this breadth of availability (again, tied to a broad
conception of religion) may—ironically but logically—have been one of
the reasons for Smith. The clause may be manageable with either a broad
definition of religion or a low bar for heightened scrutiny, but not with
both.
Let me postulate this as well of the Court’s expansive approach to
what “religion” means: Much like Sherbert and Yoder, it has less to do
with a principled and robust theory of religious freedom, and more to do
with concerns about inclusiveness and autonomy, coupled with a
modernist or post-modernist crisis in epistemology. This is a huge
problem for a robust theory of religious liberty independent of other
liberties. If the judiciary is no longer protecting practices because they
stem from obligations arising from one’s creator, discerned from scripture
and supported by the teachings of church leaders and theologians, but

43. 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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instead because a claimant simply feels a higher power or inner calling
(perhaps as much conscience as religion), then the judiciary is not
operating with a coherent theory of religious freedom but rather just
deferring to individuals’ idiosyncratic senses of self-realization,
autonomy, etc. (Or, as worded in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey joint
opinion in 1992, the Court is actualizing “the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”44) This may all seem very cynical, but viewed across multiple
lines of cases, inferences or conclusions such as these are difficult to avoid.
But this is to begin to get far afield.
To return to the state of the law, it will be interesting to see how we
as a society proceed with both a broad definition of religion (as we have
had for a while) and broad protection (as with RFRA and RLUIPA we
have had for only a short time so far). The early returns are interesting.
For example, in the case underlying Cutter v. Wilkinson,45 a 2005 Supreme
Court decision, inmates of an Ohio prison—including adherents of
Asatru, a minister of the white supremacist Church of Jesus Christ
Christian, a Wiccan, and a Satanist—challenged the state’s failure to
make certain accommodations of their non-mainstream religions. The
question before the Supreme Court was not the merits of the
accommodations sought but the state’s argument that, insofar as it
required such accommodations, RLUIPA violated the Establishment
Clause—an argument that the Court rejected. I mentioned something
about the case’s facts or parties more so that you get a flavor of the sort
of challenges that are now possible. The important doctrinal point under
RFRA is the difference from Smith, and the Court’s decision in 2006 in a
case called Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal46
lays plain that difference. The federal government seized a sacramental
tea, containing an illegal hallucinogenic substance, from a New Mexico
branch of a Brazilian church. The church challenged this in court, and
the United States Supreme Court ruled for the church. Unanimously
adopting a strong reading of RFRA, the Court invalidated the
government’s application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the
hallucinogen at issue. It refused to accept a generalized compelling
interest in drug law enforcement and instead required an explanation of
why enforcement of the specific prohibition against the specific religious

44. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
45. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
46. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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group would be compelling. There being no such explanation, the church
prevailed.
But you likely have some sense that we are a long way from Smith.
For, more recently and more famously, the Court in 2014 decided the
Hobby Lobby case.47 There the question was whether RFRA enabled
closely held private corporations (including Hobby Lobby) to claim an
exemption from federal regulations that implemented the Affordable
Care Act by requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage
for various contraceptive methods. There was no unanimity here. It was
a 5-to-4 decision, reflecting a split precisely aligned with the parties of the
presidents who appointed the members of the Court: the five Republican
appointees forming the majority and the four Democratic appointees in
dissent.
The Court in Hobby Lobby held that RFRA required the government
to accommodate the interests of a private corporation as employer in not
providing such insurance coverage. To listen to the dissent by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, this was “startling”: “[T]he Court holds that
commercial enterprises . . . can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws)
they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”48 We
need not decide whether the dissent’s characterization of the Court’s
opinion was exactly correct. The point to emphasize for us is that the
decision was based on RFRA. That was a good thing for the claimants,
by the way: Given Smith, it would have been much harder to prevail under
the Free Exercise Clause—to understate the point.
Hobby Lobby is not the Supreme Court’s latest word on religious
freedom. Within the past year, under RLUIPA, the Court decided Holt
v. Hobbs.49 There it ruled that an Arkansas prison policy preventing a
Muslim prisoner from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his
religious beliefs was unlawful—not unconstitutional, but a violation of
RLUIPA. Here the Court was unanimous.
So where are we? Well, some things suggest themselves immediately
from the recent cases—or from Hobby Lobby, at any rate. One is that
the extent of religious freedom provided by the federal government is
scarcely a settled matter. As with any 5-to-4 decision, we can say that a
change in one member of the Court might well bring with it a different
result. Another is that things are becoming more intense as a political
matter. This involves different forms. They will include the phenomenon
47. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
48. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
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of Supreme Court appointments. But they also include traditional
politics: the contents of legislation. The consensus that existed in
Congress and in the larger public about RFRA is gone. Earlier this year,
for example, the ACLU announced that, while it had supported RFRA
at the time of its passage, “we can no longer support the law in its current
form.”50 It maintains that RFRA has become not just a shield for
protecting people “whose religious expression does not harm anyone
else” but also “a sword to discriminate against women, gay and
transgender people and others.”51 This will especially be the case, the
ACLU’s spokesperson maintained, in a world where same-sex marriage
is a right—and we Americans now live in that world.52 The reaction
earlier this year to Indiana’s mini-RFRA—a state law largely tracking the
language of the federal law—can give you some sense of this.53
To conclude (or to begin to do so), we have established that the
Supreme Court’s affirmative contribution to the tradition of religious
freedom in the United States has been modest under the First
Amendment’s religion clauses. That is a carefully worded statement.
There is a robust tradition of religious freedom in this country, and the
First Amendment has had much to do with it. But much of that much has
not been the result of decisions by the Court but rather the good judgment
of government actors in generally not trying to marry together state and
church, at least outside the context of public education. And other parts
of the robust tradition have come either from state courts and the state
constitutions or from the United States Supreme Court but in its reading
of other provisions of the Constitution. Sometimes those provisions have
been more general—for example, the Due Process Clause in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters and its antecedent, Meyer v. Nebraska—and other times
they have included other parts of the First Amendment (as in the
Jehovah’s Witnesses cases in the 1940s, such as Cantwell, Murdock, and
Barnette). Only for about three decades—the second era, from Sherbert
through Yoder and up until Smith—did the Court apply the Free Exercise
Clause in a way independently to compel government actors to make

50. Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious
Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cong
ress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-1
1e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html [perma.cc/6ZFE-CT42].
51. Id.
52. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
53. See Campbell Robertson & Richard Pérez-Peña, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset
Capitols in Two States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/u
s/religious-freedom-restoration-act-arkansas-indiana.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/9XFJ-KGVB].
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exceptions to rules of general applicability such as compulsory-education
laws.
And when that happened, it came from individuals, such as Justice
Brennan, who were also hard at work using some of the same concepts to
recognize other constitutional rights, such as those in Griswold and Roe.
And the First Amendment developments would be met with the
opposition of individuals such as Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia. All of
these are careful statements, I hope. So, for example, Justice Scalia was
with the majority in Hobby Lobby—but there the issue was one of
statutory interpretation (RFRA) and not a First Amendment matter.
One would have to imagine that, if the Court had had to get to the First
Amendment claims in the case, the principles of Smith would have led
Justice Scalia in the other direction.
In short, I think us to have entered into a new era of the law of
religious freedom in this country—a fourth era. On the one hand, it
resembles the second era in terms of its willingness to carve out
exceptions based on religious grounds to neutral and generally applicable
government policies. On the other hand, it is proceeding with a much a
broader conception of religion than that with which the second era began
(the Seventh-day Adventists in Sherbert and even the Amish a decade
later in Yoder were reasonably traditional religions by standards of what
now falls within the courts’ conception of religion).
This is going to be a dynamic era. To give you a sense of it, a
discussion has recently begun among some intellectuals whether there
is—under RFRA-type laws—an ability of people to claim an exception to
anti-assisted-suicide laws on the grounds that it violates their religious
beliefs to be forbidden to help a patient or a spouse or anyone else to
escape pain (or what the person feels to be indignity) by helping him end
his life if he so wants. For Catholics, this might be an astonishing thing,
and such an argument was rejected by a court a number of years ago—
but, as one fair-minded and prominent commentator, Eugene Volokh,
has pointed out, “only because it was brought under the free exercise
clause, which [under Smith] doesn’t mandate religious objections from
generally applicable laws.”54 “But what,” this sober commentator asks,
“of the more than half the states that either have state [RFRAs], or have
state constitutional religious freedom guarantees that state courts have

54. Eugene Volokh, Assisted Suicide and Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (Sept. 28,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/28/assisted-suicid
e-and-religious-liberty/ [perma.cc/9NVA-UPHY].
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interpreted as generally providing religious exemptions?”55 Rather than
analyze a possible RFRA right to help with assisted suicide, let me
conclude this point with the commentator’s observation: “A complicated
question, which I expect that courts might well be turning to soon,
especially given the extra publicity and credibility given to religious
objection claims by recent cases such as Hobby Lobby.”56
Let me take a few minutes to conclude more broadly as well. To do
this, let me note something about what judges do. Yes, in the context of
specific cases, they interpret the Constitution and statutes, but in doing
this they never get away from their education in the common law, which
involves grappling with concepts such as “reasonableness.” And what
does this involve—or, at any rate, where do judges get the notions and
precepts underlying this grappling? They get it, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., instructed us in the late nineteenth century, not so much from “logic”
as from “experience.”57 This is relevant here because there will be much
common-law reasoning in applying RFRA, as judges determine whether
a government obligation “substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of
religion” and, if so, whether it is in “furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest.” There will, in other words, be much occasion for
exercising judgment. That is what judges do, for better or for worse, and
they will be influenced, as judges with discretion always have been, less
by the “syllogism” (or logic) and more by “experience”—or, to complete
the quote from Holmes, by “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen [and women, we might add].”58
So, without doubt, we must hope for good judgment. At the same
time, the last word here should not be from Holmes or RFRA but from a
source both less and more authoritative. Consider that a broad theme of
my lecture has been that people are wrong to think that the Supreme
Court has protected religious liberty for the past two centuries. In fact, it
has done rather little in that regard—and even less by way of protecting
religious liberty separate and apart from “liberty” more generally. And
so, in closing this Pallium Lecture, I am reminded of the wisdom of Psalm
146: “Put not your trust in princes . . . .”59
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“Put not your trust in princes.” I confess that the admonition is taken
out of context, but is this not the right attitude for citizens of a democracy
to cultivate? Princes in black robes are no more to be trusted to protect
our freedoms than are any others. In the end, it is only the hard work of
influencing elected representatives to pass laws (such as RFRA, perhaps)
and of electing executives who truly cherish religious liberty themselves
that will give its proponents a fighting chance.
I thank Archbishop Listecki for his confidence in inviting me to
deliver this year’s Pallium Lecture. And I thank all of you for your kind
attention to the lecture. I hope that you have found something of value
in it.

